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ANTITRUST AND LABOR
Russell A. Smith*
thirteen-page treatment of the subject of "organized labor" in
the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws shows that the committee approached the
subject gingerly, and that the counsel of moderation prevailed. The
views of those who would change the national policy favoring (or at
least tolerating) the existing institutions of trade unionism and collective bargaining by subjecting unions to "monopoly" standards are
not discussed in the Report.1 The result is a limited and generalized
approach, which holds that some kinds of union practices "aimed directly at commercial market restraints" run counter to our national antitrust policy and should be prohibited by some law. With but two dissenting voices the committee says:
" . . . This Committee believes that union actions aimed at
directly fixing the kind or amount of products which may be used,
produced or sold, their market price, the geographical area in
which they may be used, produced or sold, or the number of firms
which may engage in their production or distribution are contrary
to antitrust policy. To the best of our knowledge, no national
union Hatly claims the right to engage in such activities. We believe that where the concession demanded from an employer as
prerequisite to ordering the cessation of coercive action against him
is participation in such a scheme for market control, this union
conduct should be prohibited by some statute."2

T

HE

Most observers will agree with this expression of policy, though many,
with the dissenters, will be apprehensive of a statutory formulation of
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
These views are well illustrated by the Gwinn-Fisher Bill, H.R. 8449, 82d Cong.,
2d sess. (1952). For discussions of these proposals, see Iserman, "The Labor Monopoly
Problem: Gwinn-Fisher Bill Would Effect Reforms," 38 A.B.A.J. 743 (1952); and
Kamin, "The Fiction of 'Labor Monopoly': A Reply to Mr. Iserman," id. at 748.
The Gwinn-Fisher bill would not only cover direct commercial restraints of the kind
envisaged by the antitrust committee's proposal, but, in addition, would attempt to eliminate what Mr. Iserman refers to as "centralized control of bargaining." This would be
accomplished by making illegal multiple employer bargaining or concerted action, and concerted action among unions, in relation to wages and other terms of employment, except
in the case of small, local labor market bargaining units numbering not more than 5,000 ·
employees.
2 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, March 31, 1955, p. 294 (hereinafter referred to as REPORT, followed by the
page number).
1
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this proposition in such general terms that "potential abuse" will be
invited.3
The committee's failure to discuss the basic economic issues raised
by the existence of union power doubtless reB.ects its judgment of the
scope of its assignment. "At the outset," the Report begins, "we emphasize that appraisal of the Nation's labor-management relations
policy goes beyond this antitrust study."4 Thus the committee assumed,
on the one hand, that the national labor policy is to encourage collective bargaining on terms and conditions of employment/ and, on the
other hand, that the national antitrust policy is the "promotion of competition in open markets." 6 The committee evidently believed that it
was not called upon to evaluate the one policy as against the other, but
was to view-each p-olicyas of-equal standing· :tn the national hierarchy
of values. Thus, it accepted as its responsibility only an inquiry into
"those union activities, not directed at such established [i.e., recognized] union ends, but instead at direct restraints on commercial competition."7 Constituted as the committee was, I think this was a wise
decision. At the same time it must be recognized that the proponents
and opponents of an antitrust curb on union power as such may fairly
claim that this issue was not considered on the merits.
Even within the comparatively narrow jurisdictional limits set by
the committee, it has not undertaken to make a first-hand examination
of the relevant facts. One gathers that primary reliance has been
placed upon "reported cases," relatively few in number, to show the
existence of the practices which the committee condemns. 8 This is
consistent with the general thesis of the committee, underlying its entire report, that its "aim is not to add to the storehouse of statistical
data or to survey the economic effects of antitrust applications to specific industries" but, rather, "to weave as coherent a pattern as possible
in the light of the differences and seeming inconsistencies of the legislative and judicial strands that make up our antitrust fabric" in the hope
3 Thus, in a dissent filed by Walter Adams, and concurred in by Raymond Dickey,
the point is made that "to the extent that the limits of challenged union conduct are defined in terms of 'object' (i.e., intent), the proposal is subject to potential abuse." RE'·
.PORT 305.
4 REPORT 293.
Ii Ibid.

1.
294.
s "Reported- cases indicate, however, that some unions have engaged in some practices
aimed directly at commercial market restraints by fixing the kind or amount of products
which may be sold in any area or their market price." REPORT 304.
6REPORT
7 RE.PORT
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that "clarification" will yield better guides to those concemed.9 With
respect to trade union practices, this "clarification" consists in showing that existing law deals to some extent with the subject, hut, as the
committee thinks, incompletely. The logic appears to he that existing
law shows that the practices in question are not justifiable, and that
the problem is simply to close gaps and round out enforcement. This
is a plausible methodology, hut it involves the risk of criticism that the
exact dimensions of the problems under consideration have not been
taken.10
The committee's approach makes its analysis of existing federal
law very important. This consists of examination of "antitrust coverage" and of the "relevant provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947." The committee has furnished us with a succinct
and useful analysis of the pertinent statutes and decisions.

The Survey of Antitrust Coverage
The survey of antitrust coverage reviews, in about eight printed
pages, the history and present status of trade unions under the Sherman Act. The Report begins with a summary of the 1908 decision of
the Court in the Danbury Hatters1 1 case, and treats next the judicial
delimitation of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act in the Duplex1- 2
and Bedford Cut Stone13 cases. Proceeding chronologically, it finds
that a key distinction emerged in the Coronado14 and Apex1 5 cases be9lu!J.>ORT 4.
1 0'fhus, the

dissenting statement_ of Walter Adams states: ''In dissenting, I am not
unmindful of the concern over allegedly widespread labor abuses. I believe, however, that
corrective legislation-if, when and by whomsoever proposed-should be based on a careful and comprehensive investigation of all the facts within the context of market reality."
Rm>oRT 305-306.
11 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S.Ct. 301 (1908).
12 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172 (1921). For
comments on this case, see 21 CoL. L. REv. 258 (1921); 34 HARv. L. REv. 880 at 885
(1921); 1 W1s. L. REv. 186 (1921); Mason, ''The Labor Clauses of the Clayton Act,"
18 AM. PoL. Sm. REv. 489 (1924); and Powell, ''The Supreme Court's Control Over
the Issuance of Injunctions in Labor Disputes," 13 Pnoc. AM. PoL. Sm. AssN. 37 at 49-54
(1928).
13 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutter's Assn., 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct.
522 (1927).
14 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct.
570 (1922); 268 U.S. 295, 45 S.Ct. 551 (1925).
15 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940). For comments
on this case, see Brown, "The Apex Case and Its Effect Upon Labor Activities and the
Anti-Trust Laws," 21 Bos-r. UNIV. L. REv. 48 (1941); Gregory, "The Sherman Act v.
Labor," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 222 (1941); Cavers, ''Labor v. Sherman Act," 8 UNIV.
Cm. L. REv. 246 (1941); Landis, "The Apex Case," 26 CoRN. L. Q. 191 (1941);
Steffen, ''Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Apex Case,'' 50 YALE L. J. 787
(1941); and notes in 54 HARv. L. REv. 146 (1940), and 39 Micg. L. REv. 462 (1941).
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tween union activities aimed at "furthering rightful union objectives"
and activities aimed at suppressing commercial competition. Finally,
it considers the limiting impact of United States v. Hutcheson16 and
the broadening impact of Allen-Bradley.11 These and related cases
are, of course, familiar to students of labor law. The committee essays
to interpret, not to appraise, these decisions. In this group of cases
the Coronado-Apex, Hutcheson, and Allen-Bradley trilogy are obviously the most important.
In Coronado and Apex the Court had to consider primary union
concerted action, unlawful by standards of tort law,1 8 directed for recognition or organizational purposes against a mine operator and a
hosiery manufacturer, respectively. The violent conduct involved
clearly was not immunized by section 20 of the Clayton Act. However, this fact alone did not, by inverse reasoning, require the conclusion that the Sherman Act could be applied. The Court held, in line
with established doctrine, that the act was not designed to provide an
additional federal remedy against violence affecting interstate commerce but; rather, to deal with conduct specifically aimed at market
restrictions.19 The Court ruled that this intent could not be predicated alone on the reduction through strike action of the supply of a
product entering interstate commerce, but had to involv~ the specific
purpose "to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in in16 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463 (1941). For discussions of this case see Cavers, "And
What of the Apex Case Now?" 8 UNIV. Cm. L. Iu!v. 516 (1941); Gregory, ''The New
Sherman-Clayton-Norris-LaGuardia Act," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 503 (1941); Carey,
''The Apex and Hutcheson Cases," 25 MINN. L. RBv. 915 (1941); Tunks, "A New
Federal Charter for Trade Unionism," 41 CoL. L. Iu!v. 969 (1941); Teller, "Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining-the Hutcheson Case," 40 MrCH.
L. RBv. 24 (1941); Steffen, "Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade; The Hutcheson
Case," 36 !LL. L. RBv. 1 (1941); Nathanson and Wirtz, ''The Hutcheson Case: Another View," 36 !LL. L. RBv. 41 (1941); and notes in 41 CoL. L. Iu!v. 532 (1941), 29
GEo. L. J. 770 (1941), 9 GEo. WASH. L. RBv. 724 (1941), and 89 UNIV. PA. L. RBv.
827 (1941).
17 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Intl. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533 (1945). See Dodds, "The Supreme Court and Organized
Labor, 1941-1945," 58 HARv. L. RBv. 1018 (1945), and notes in 45 CoL. L. RBv. 272
(1945), 58 HARv. L. RBv. 273 (1944), and 43 Mrca L. RBv. 818 (1945).
18 In Coronado, the Union used tactics of physical violence, and in Apex the Union
used the "sit-down" strike.
19 Jn Apex, Justice Stone said, for the Court: ''These cases [referring to the Coronado
cases, among others] show that activities of labor organizations not immunized by the Clayton
Act are not necessarily violations of the Sherman Act. Underlying and implicit in all of them
is recognition that the Sherman Act was not enacted to police interstate transportation, or
to afford a remedy for wrongs, which are actionable under state law, and result from combinations and conspiracies which fall short, both in their purpose and effect, of any form of market control of a commodity, such as to 'monopolize the supply, control its price, or discriminate between its would-be purchasers.'" Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 at
512, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940).
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terstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate markets." 20 This
formulation of the rule led to a retrial in Coronado, in which the required motivation was held to have been established. In Apex no such
showing was made, so the action against the union was dismissed.
"From this decision," according to the committee's analysis, "there
emerges a distinction, deemed essential by this committee, between
union activities aiming, on the one hand, at furthering rightful union
objectives and, on the other hand, at directly 'suppressing [commercial]
competition or fixing prices' of commercial products."21 The committee evidently considers that this distinction may have continuing
vitality despite United States v. Hutcheson, and, on this basis, it concludes, as its first proposition by way of summarizing existing law,
that "where the union engages in fraud or violence and intends or
achieves some direct commercial restraint," it "may be" vulnerable to
Sherman Act proceedings. 22
The committee has, I think, treated a little too cavalierly the
Coronado-Apex cases. These cases did, indeed, narrow the scope of
the Sherman Act in relation to trade union activities by emphasizing
that liability had to be founded upon some direct and intentiqnal connection between the union's activities and market restraint or control.23
Yet the evidence which the Court ultimately found sufficient, in the
second Coronado opinion, to establish liability was nothing more nor
less than a concern of the embattled United Mine Workers that nonunion coal from the Bache-Denman mines upon entering the interstate market might seriously endanger wage scales prevailing in unionized mines. 24 It is significant, however, that the union's conduct was
20 Ibid.
21 RBPOR'I' 296.
22 RBPOR'I' 299.
23 This kind of intent was

not required in the early interstate secondary boycott cases,
such as Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S.Ct. 301 (1908).
2 4 Note the following, for example, from the second opinion:
"Part of the new evidence was an extract from the convention proceedings of District
No. 21 at Fort Smith, Arkansas, in February, 1914, in which the delegates discussed the
difficulties presented in their maintenance of the union scale in Arkansas, Oklahoma and
Texas because of the keen competition from the non-union £elds of Southern Colorado and
the non·union £elds of the South in Alabama and Tennessee. Stewart, the president,
called attention to a new £eld in Oklahoma which he said would be a great competitor
of union coal £elds, and that District No. 21 would be forced to call a strike to bring into
line certain operators in that section, and in the event that they did so the District would
£ght such a conflict to the bitter end regardless of cost. They also discussed a proposal
to reduce the scale at the union mines at McCurtain, Oklahoma, which Stewart advocated,
in order that the McCurtain operators might be put on a proper competitive basis in interstate markets with other operators. Several of the delegates at this convention took part in
the riot of April 6th and the battle of July 17th following." 268 U.S. 295 at 306-307,
45 S.Ct. 551 (1925).
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in the setting of a decision by the Coronado Company to abandon the
union shop and the union wage scale. Basically, the union sought to
compel the company to rescind this decision. Concern with the protection of employment standards in organized areas is surely present
in many, if not most, union recognition campaigns. While Justice
Stone reiterated with apparent approval in the Apex opinion the antitrust-labor formula stated in Coronado, there is reason to doubt, from
other observations in his opinion, that the Court in 1940 would have
held this element alone sufficient to establish Sherman Act liability.25
Moreover, I doubt that this organizational motivation for concerted action is intended by the committee to be included as one of the "specific
union activities which have as their direct object direct control of the
market ... ,"26 and which should therefore be prohibited by law, for
any such proposal would be inconsistent with the national "labormanagement relations policy," which the committee accepts. I think
we must credit the committee simply with approval of the general
formulation of antitrust doctrine in Coronado and Apex., and not read
its analysis and recommendation as an underwriting of the specific
decision in Coronado.
A fairly persuasive argument can be made, as a matter of fact, that
the Court in the later Hutcheson and Allen-Bradley cases actually
moved away from the Coronado-Apex formula to a position which excludes union activities from antitrust coverage except where they are
part of a concert with employers to accomplish objectives outlawed by
the Sherman Act. In Hutcheson the Court used the now famous "inter25 The following interesting paragraph appears in Justice Stone's opinion in Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 at 503-504, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940):
·
"Strikes or agreements not to work, entered into by laborers to compel employers to
yield to their demand, may restrict to some extent the power of employers who are parties
to the dispute to compete in the market with those not subject to such demands. But
under the doctrine applied to non-labor cases, the mere fact of such restrictions on competition does not in itself bring the parties to the agreement within the condemnation of the
Sherman Act. Appalachian Coals v. United States, supra, 360. Furthermore, successful
union activity, as for example consummation of a wage agreement with employers, may
have some influence on price competition by eliminating that part of such competition which
is based on differences in labor standards. Since, in order to render a labor combination
effective it must eliminate the competition frolll non-union made goods, see American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209, an elimination of price
competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor
organization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of
curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act. See Levering & Garrigues
Co. v. Morrin, supra; cf. American Foundries case, supra, 209; National Association of
Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403."
It may be questioned whether the United Mine Workers, in Coronado, was really
seeking anything more than the "'elimination of price competition based on labor standards."
26 R.l!.PORT 304.
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lacing statutes" rationale to immunize peaceful jurisdictional strike
and boycott conduct from liability under the Sherman Act. It reasoned that since such conduct is not enjoinable under section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and since a primary purpose of the Norris Act
was to repudiate the narrow construction which had been placed on
section 20 of the Clayton Act, Congress must have intended that the
general immunity granted by section 20 to kinds of conduct made nonenjoinable should be extended to conduct protected against injunction
by the Norris Act. 27 The most interesting point about this analysis,
for present purposes, lies in the fact that it was really unnecessary,
for, as Justice Stone pointed out in his concurring opinion, union nonliability was clear under previous decisions of the Court, especially
Apex. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that Justice Frankfurter and his associates joining in the majority opinion, who did not
even discuss the Coronado and Apex cases, deliberately chose an approach to union Sherman Act coverage different from and narrower
than that laid down previously. The shift seems to have been away
from a doctrine which required an examination of specific union objectives or intentions and toward a rule which inquires simply whether
the union is engaging in peaceful concerted action in connection with
a labor dispute. It is clear, at least, that the Hutcheson doctrine would
reject antitrust coverage of union strike action for Coronado-type objectives in the absence of violence.
The question, then, is whether Sherman Act liability would conceivably be permitted to turn simply on the question whether union
conduct in connection with a labor dispute is violent (hence enjoinable despite Norris Act limitations) or non-violent (hence nonenjoinable). The committee evidently believes that this may be so, despite
the point emphasized in Apex and other cases that the Sherman Act
was not designed simply to police violence. The 1945 decision in
the Allen-Bradley case is the most recent general treatment of the
question, and the language used in the opinion is therefore significant.
27 The

opinion, by Justice Frankfurter, states:
"The Norris-LaGuardia Act removed the fetters upon trade union activities, which
according to judicial construction §20 of the Clayton Act had left untouched, by still further narrowing the circumstances under which the federal courts could grant injunctions
in labor disputes. More especially, the Act explicitly formulated the 'public policy of the
United States' in regard to the industrial conflict, and by its light established that the
allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had been in the Duplex case,
to an immediate employer-employee relation. Therefore, whether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act is to be determined only by reading the Sherman
Law and §20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of
outlawcy of labor conduct." 312 U.S. 219 at 231, 61 S.Ct. 463 (1941).
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The holding was that a union which had entered into formal agreements with manufacturers which were designed to protect an area
price structure by excluding non-area products from the area market
and to give the area union a monopoly on area work was equally guilty
under the Sherman Act with the manufacturers, even though the union
acted in pursuit of "their own interests as wage earners."28 The
Court reviewed the history of labor under the act ( without, however,
mentioning the Coronado cases). Apex, it said, left labor unions still
subject to the act to "'some extent not defined.'" The Hutcheson
doctrine was restated approvingly, with the observation that the union
action which lay in the background in Allen-Bradley (threats of peaceful -strikes and boycotts) would not have been a violation of the Sherman Act had there been no "union-contractor-manufacturer combination," even though the union, acting alone, might, as the "natural consequence" of its activities, have produced an exclusion of outside products from the market. The Court concluded, "Our holding means
that the same labor union activities may or may not be in violation of
the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in
combination with business groups." 29 The general tenor of the opinion
justifies the view that the Court regarded traditional types of union
concerted action as excluded from Sherman Act coverage where used
in connection with a "labor dispute," except only where they are used
specifically to aid a business combination. The Court could have
stated expressly, either in Hutcheson or in Allen-Bradley, that the general exclusion of union action from the Sherman Act would be deemed
forfeited if a union resorted to non-peaceful concerted action, but it
did not do so.
The committee's next proposition is that commercial restraints by
unions may be vulnerable to antitrust proceedings "where the union
activity is not in the course of a labor dispute as defined in the NorrisLaGuardia Act." This suggests that even peaceful types of union
concerted action may be subject to the Sherman Act in some circumstances. The Report cites the Hawaiian Tuna Packers3° and Columbia River Packers Association31 cases as the primary basis for this con28 The opinion, by Justice Black, states: "Our problem in this case is therefore a
very narrow one-do labor unions violate the Sherman Act when, in order to further their
own interests as wage earners, they aid and abet business men to do the precise things which
that Act prohibits?" 325 U.S. 797 at 801, 65 S.Ct. 1533 (1945).
29 325 U.S. 797 at 810, 65 S.Ct., 1533 (1945).
3 0Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's
Union, (D.C. Hawaii 1947) 72 F. Supp. 562.
31 Columbia River Packer's Assn. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 62 S.Ct. 520 (1942).
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clusion. In each of these cases there were involved, within the
"union," individuals (fishermen) whom the Court considered to be
independent entrepreneurs, not employees, and the Court viewed the
cases as attempts to achieve price-£.xing, not wage-£.xing. This is not
the occasion for a critical examination of the Court's independent enterpriser analysis, although this point is not free of difficulty as some
of the cases (non-antitrust) involving services rather than products
suggest. 32 One may agree with the committee, at least, that the
Hutcheson doctrine does not seem to apply where there is no incident
of an employment relationship at stake in the concerted action.
The committee suggests further that cases such as Giboney v. Empire Storage Co.33 tend to show by analogy that "a dispute involving
the object of direct market control may not constitute a 'labor dispute'
within Norris-LaGuardia...." 34 In the Giboney case the courts of
Missouri held that picketing as part of a course of action designed to
force an ice supplier to stop sales to non-union peddlers was enjoinable
because the union sought thereby to force the supplier to violate the
state's antitrust laws. The only question presented to the Supreme
Court was whether this injunction was forbidden under the picketingfree speech principle declared in the Thornhill35 case. Clearly, the
Court, in holding that the civil rights of the union were not violated by
the injunction, did not purport to say that similar union conduct involving interstate commerce would be violative of the Sherman Act or
would be subject to injunction despite the Norris Act. The committee's point, however, may be simply that the Court, by indicating its
willingness to permit a state to give effect to its antitrust policies in
cases involving union activity, thereby suggested that it may be ready
to narrow further the "labor dispute" definition of the Norris Act.
This interpretation of the case is a bit fanciful.
The final proposition of the committee is that a union engaged
in commercial restraints may be vulnerable to antitrust proceedings
where it "combines with some nonlabor group to effect some direct
commercial restraint." 36 This conclusion is clearly warranted by Allen-Bradley. Also warranted is the view that section 6 of the Norris
32 See, e.g.: NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944);
Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312
U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552 (1941); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 67 S.Ct. 1463
(1947).
33 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949).
34 REPORT 298.
ar; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
36 REPORT 300.
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Act, as construed in United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America v. United States,3 7 places serious obstacles in the path of the
government or a private party in attempting to enforce against unions
even those limited types of Sherman Act liability which still exist.
The problem is to connect the union with the conduct of individual
members or officers. It is noteworthy tkat the burden of proof here is
much heavier than would be the case under ordinary agency principles
or, indeed, under Taft-Hartley. 38 This fact underlines further the
point that existing possibilities of antitrust coverage of trade union
conduct are limited.
The Survey of Relevant Provisions of T afe-Hartley

·In its brief survey of Taft-Hartley in relation to the problem of
market restraints, the committee mentions only the so-called ''boycott"
provisions of the act and points out that these reach union activities
aimed at suppressing commercial competition in some circumstances,
but not in others. Such activities are covered where they involve the
elements of liability prescribed by section 8(b)(4) of Title I. There
must be a strike or an inducement of employees to strike or to refuse,
in the course of their e~ployment, to handle goods or perform services,
where an object is some one of those proscribed. The broadest of the
proscribed objects is stated in clause (A), and includes, in substance,
forcing one employer to cease doing business with another person.
"Commercial restraints," as defined by the committee, are not specificially a proscribed object, but it is clear that if a union, in order to
effect a commercial restraint, engages, for example, in secondary strike
action, it violates the act. Primary concerted action, secondary action
by persons otherwise than in the course of their employment, and sec330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775 (1947).
§6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
"No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in
any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or
agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such
acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof." 47 Stat. L. 71 (1932),
29 u.s.c. (1952) §106.
On the other hand, §2 of Title I of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
in e.'Cpressing what amounts to standard agency doctrine, states:
''When used in this Act"(13) In determining whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person
so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific
acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."
67 Stat. L. 139, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §152 (13).
37

38 Thus,
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ondary action not undertaken by the use of strike threats (for example,
direct appeals to consumers or suppliers) are not covered by this
provision even though intended to achieve commercial restraints. It
is therefore true, as the committee states, that commercial restraints are
covered under some circumstances but not others.
The committee does not mention section 8(b)(6) of Title I. This
so-called "anti-featherbedding provision" makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or
deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in
the nature of an exaction for services which are not performed or not
to be performed." Perhaps the committee's recommendations do not
encompass union "featherbedding'' demands. The proposal is to
reach "only specific union activities which have as their direct object
control of the market, such as 6.xing the kind or amount of products
which may be used ... ," and a demand for the employment of standby or unnecessary labor, as a response to technological change, could
be considered as an indirect, rather than a direct, attempt to limit the
kind of products which may be used. If so, the point is interesting in
the light of the fact that the Thurman Arnold antitrust-labor policy
as promulgated in 1939 contemplated that this type of union restraint
should be subject to antitrust proceedings. 39 Possibly the committee
considers the Taft-Hartley attack upon this problem to be adequate,
or at least as expressing the extent of national policy, despite the limited
interpretation of section 8(b)(6) which the Supreme Court has approved.40
In general it is the conclusion of the committee that the Taft-Hartley Act provides incomplete protection against union action which
seeks commercial restraints. Moreover, the committee makes the point
that, unlike the Sherman Act, proceedings under the Taft-Hartley Act
may not be initiated by the government in the absence of formal complaints, and this is considered to be a weakness. There is no question
as to the accuracy of the committee's judgment concerning the adequacy of Taft-Hartley from the point of view of the objectives which
39 Among the types of "unreasonable restraint" which were thought to be "unquestionable violations of the Sherman Act" (as of 1939) were "unreasonable restraints designed to compel the hiring of useless and unnecessary labor." See Mr. Arnold's letter to
the Central Labor Union, AFL, of Indianapolis, 5 LAB. REL. REP. 316-317 (1939), reprinted in SMITH's CAsBs AND MATERIALS ON LABoR LAw, 2d ed., 408 (1953).
40 In American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100, 73 S.Ct. 552
(1953), and NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117, 73 S.Ct. 560 (1953), the
Court agreed with the NLRB that §8(b)(6) should not be construed to reach demands by
a union that the employer hire unwanted labor. Thus, unless the demand is that the
employer pay for services not offered, the section will not apply.

MicmGAN LAw Rnvmw

1130

[ Vol. 53

the committee considers desirable. As the committee points out, the
framers evidently believed that the new unfair labor practice provisions
written into the law would reach broadly the types of undesirable union
conduct which constituted the most serious problems. They wrote
this law at a time when the extent of antitrust coverage of union
activities was uncertain. Evidently, they elected not to focus specifically on the subject of commercial restraints.
The Committee's Conclusions and Recommendations

The committee recommends "appropriate legislation" to prohibit
union efforts "at outright market control," to the extent that "such
commercial restraints" are not effectively curbed either by the antitrust laws or by the Labor-Management Relations Act. 41 "Regarding
such legislation," the committee makes three points: (a) the legislation
"should cover only specific union activities" having as their "direct"
object commercial restraints of the kinds mentioned; (b) the government should be empowered to proceed against such restraints "on its
own initiative"; and (c) the legislation "should not contain provisions
for private injunction." Thus, the committee takes no position on
the question whether the proposed legislation should be incorporated
in the antitrust laws, the Taft-Hartley Act, or a separate statute. Certain of the suggested remedial characteristics of the new law would
depart from the pattern of either existing law.
The Report states, as its first recommendation, that the legislation
"should cover only specific union activities which have as their direct
object direct control of the market, such as fixing the kind or amount of
products which may be used, produced or sold, their market price, the
geographical area_ in which they may be sold, or the number of firms
which may engage in their production or distribution."42 The Adams
dissent objects that "to the extent that the limits of challenged union
conduct are defined in terms of 'object' (i.e., intent), the proposal is
subject to potential abuse," and that "unlike the Taft-Hartley Act, it
does not pinpoint specific malpractices in terms of a clearly delineated
course of conduct."43 Mr. Adams may be correct in his apprehensions.
On the other hand, the committee may have in mind that the legislation should specify concretely the "specific union activities" which
would be illegal. This point is left unclear by the Report, although it
41 REPORT
42 Ibid.

304.

43 REPORT

305.
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may be supposed that some considerable difficulty would be encountered in framing statutory language which would be more "specific."
Certainly it is apparent that a statutory formula in the language
used in the recommendation would present some interesting litigious
possibilities. Under the proposal union action, to be covered by the
prohibition, would have to have as its "direct'' object "direct" control
of the market. By way of example, the use of the word "direct" as a
dual modifier (or qualifier) could produce an interesting question
whether the Coronado type of union conduct (tortious strike action
intended either to force unionization, or to keep non-union products
out of an interstate market in order to protect union wage scales)
would be considered as having as a direct (or only an indirect) object
direct (or only indirect) control of market price. Similarly, the question could arise whether the refusal of union workers to use certain
labor-saving machinery (for example, the refusal of painters to use
spray guns or rollers) would be considered as having as its direct object direct control of the "kind" of products produced or sold, or, on
the other hand, as directly intended simply to preserve work for union
members. Again, the question might be whether union-imposed production standards ( daily or hourly work limitations, for example, in
the case of craftsmen) could be considered a form of "direct control"
of the "amount of products which may be used," and, if so, whether a
"direct object" of the union action. Too broad and loose an application of the suggested standard could result in the attempted prohibition of some kinds of union action which stern from considerations of
self-interest and which, though possibly prejudicial to the interests of
others, are nevertheless within the general privilege now accorded to
labor.
I do not suggest that these illustrative questions should be decided
one way or the other. I do believe, however, that in the area of labor
relations law it is especially important for the legislator to think out
clearly the policy which he proposes to write into law, and put the
policy into language which will not require very much "filling in" by
the judiciary. If the statutory language must, perforce, be cast in
general terms out of sheer necessity or desperation, then I suggest that
the legislative history should show as completely as possible, perhaps
by enumeration of concrete illustrative exarnples,4 4 the kinds of cases
44 See, for example, the detailed pre-enactment consideration of the contemplated
impact of certain amendments of the Fair Labor Standards Act in Conference Report, H.
Rep. 1453 on H.R. 5856, 81st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 14 and 15 (1949).
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intended to be covered and excluded from coverage. Otherwise, the
courts will have the difficult task of reconciling competing and at times
conflicting general statutory policies. The history of our labor law
shows that this kind of abdication of legislative responsibility is both
unfair and unwise.
The committee has performed a useful function in its limited
treatment of the "antitrust" aspects of trade unionism, even though its
principal proposal needs further elucidation and examination. The
committee has demonstrated that there are areas of uncertainty in our.
national policy which should be clari:6.ed, and its work should stimulate
the further detailed consideration which the development of a sound
policy will require.

